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Abstract
When a mean field game satisfies certain monotonicity conditions, the mean field
equilibrium is unique and the corresponding value function satisfies the so called master
equation. In general, however, there can be multiple equilibriums which typically lead to
different values. In this paper we study the set of values over all mean field equilibriums,
which we call the set value of the game. We shall establish two main properties of the
set value: (i) the dynamic programming principle; (ii) the convergence of the set values
of the corresponding N -player games. We emphasize that the set value is very sensitive
to the choice of the admissible controls. For the dynamic programming principle, one
needs to use closed loop controls (instead of open loop controls). For the convergence,
one has to restrict to the same type of equilibriums for the N-player game and for the
mean field game. We shall investigate three cases, two in finite state space models and
the other in a diffusion model.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study mean field games without monotonicity conditions. There are typi-
cally multiple mean field equilibriums with possibly different values. We propose to study
the set of values over all equilibriums, which we call the set value of the mean field game.
Note that our set value is by definition unique and it always exists, by considering empty
set as a possible value. We shall establish two main properties of the set value:
• the dynamic programming principle, or say the time consistency;
• the convergence of the set values of the corresponding N -player games.
For general theory of mean field games, we refer to the classical references Caines-Huang-
Malhame [6], Lasry-Lions [28], Cardaliaguet [7], Bensoussan-Frehse-Yam [5], and Camona-
Delarue [11, 12].
When the mean field equilibrium is unique, typically under certain monotonicity condi-
tions, our set value is reduced to the singleton of the standard value function of the game,
which solves the so called master equation, see e.g. [11, 12]. We remark that in this case
the value function satisfies the dynamic programming principle, which is the underlying
reason for the PDE approach to work, as in the standard control theory. However, with
the presence of multiple equilibriums, to our best knowledge this is the first work in the
literature to study the mean field game dynamically and to address the time consistency
issue. Our set value approach follows from Feinstein-Rudloff-Zhang [21], which establishes
the dynamic programming principle for set values of nonzero sum games with finitely many
players. See also some related works Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti [1] and Sannikov [32] in eco-
nomics literature, as well as Feinstein [20] which studies the set of equilibriums instead
of values. To ensure the dynamic programming principle, it is crucial to use closed-loop
controls. Indeed, with open loop controls, even a two person zero sum game can be time
inconsistent, see Pham-Zhang [31] for a counterexample. We also remark that, the dynamic
programming principle opens the door to a possible PDE approach by introducing the so
called set valued PDE, which we shall leave for future research.
There have been many publications concerning the convergence from the N -player game
to the mean field game. In the realm of master equations, again under certain monotonicity
conditions, one can show that the empirical measure of the closed-loop equilibriums of the
N -player games converge to the unique mean field equilibrium, and the corresponding values
also converge. See Cardaliaguet-Delarue-Lasry-Lions [8], followed by Bayraktar-Cohen [2],
Cecchin-Pelino [15], Delarue-Lacker-Ramanan [18, 19], Gangbo-Meszaros [25], and Mou-
Zhang [29], to mention a few. So our work extends these convergence results to the set
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values for more general mean field games.
For general mean field games without uniqueness, the majority of the literature on the
convergence analysis consider open loop controls. We refer to Camona-Delarue [10], Feleqi
[22], Fischer [23], Lacker [26], Lasry-Lions [28], Nutz-San Martin-Tan [30]. In particular,
[26] provides the full characterization for the convergence: any limit of approximate Nash
equilibriums of N -player games is a weak mean field equilibrium, and conversely any weak
mean field equilibrium can be obtained as such a limit. The work [23] is also in this
direction. We shall emphasize again that open loop equilibriums do not enjoy the time
consistency, namely an open loop equilibrium for the game over time period [0, T ] may not
remain an equilibrium for the subgame over a later time period [t, T ], and consequently the
corresponding set value would violate the dynamic programming principle.
The situation becomes much more subtle in the closed-loop case. Our work is highly
inspired by the seminal paper Lacker [27], whose main result reads roughly as follows:
{Strong MFEs} ⊂ {Limit of N -player approx. equilibriums} ⊂ {Weak MFEs}. (1.1)
Here a strong MFE means a mean field equilibrium which depends only on the state pro-
cesses, while a weak MFE allows for additional randomness. That is, any strong mean field
equilibrium is the limit of some approximate Nash equilibrium of N -player games, and any
limit of approximate Nash equilibrium of N -player games is a weak mean field equilibrium.
However, the equalities in (1.1) are not clear, in particular, the left inclusion is known
to be strict. Our goal is to establish the exact convergence, namely equality in (1.1), for
closed-loop equilibriums and more importantly for the corresponding set values.
We emphasize that the set value is extremely sensitive to the types of controls we
use. To ensure the convergence, one simple but crucial observation is that the N -player
game and the mean field game should use the ”same” type of controls. We illustrate this
point by considering two cases. Note that in the standard literature along the mean field
equilibrium each player is required to use the same closed-loop control. We will obtain
the desired convergence by restricting the N -player game to homogeneous equilibriums,
namely each player also uses the same closed-loop controls. In the second case we consider
heterogenous equilibriums for the N -player games. Note that a closed-loop control means
the control depends only on the state. In this heterogenous case players with the same
state may choose different controls, then one can not expect in the limit they will have
to use the same control. Indeed, in this case the limit is characterized by the mean field
game with relaxed controls, or say mixed strategies, which exactly means players with the
same state may still have a distribution of controls to choose from. For the homogeneous
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case, we investigate both a discrete time model with finite state space and a continuous
time diffusion model with drift controls, and for the heterogeneous case we investigate the
discrete model only.
Besides our focus on the set values, there are two subtle differences in the setting of N -
player games between our paper and [27]. First, [27] considers controls with full information,
namely the controls may depend on the states of all players. We instead uses symmetric
controls, where a player’s control depends only on his/her own state and the empirical
measure of the other players’ states. That is, a player can distinguish other players only
through their states, not by their names, or say, a player cannot distinguish two other
players if their states are equal. Given that N is large, this restriction is not stringent for
many applications. Nevertheless, in light of the strict inclusion in (1.1), it will be very
interesting to find an appropriate notion of mean field equilibrium, somewhat between the
relaxed controls and the weak MFE, so that the corresponding set value will be equal to
the limit of the set values for the N -player games with full information controls.
The second difference is that [27] uses compactness arguments for the convergence, while
we rely on certain regularity we impose on the controls, so our set of admissible controls is
slightly smaller. We remark that the symmetric control also helps in this respect because
of its weak interaction, namely each individual player will not have big impact on the other
players’ controls, due to the weight 1N in the empirical measure.
We shall also remark that, to ensure the convergence, we introduce the set value as the
limit of values over approximate equilibriums, rather than the set of values over true equi-
libriums. We call the latter the raw set value, which also satisfies the dynamic programming
principle. However, the raw set value is extremely sensitive to the small perturbations of the
game parameters, in fact, in general even its measurability is not clear, so one can hardly
expect the convergence for the raw set values. In the standard control theory, the value
function is defined as the infimum of controlled values, which is exactly the limit of values
over approximate optimal controls, rather than the value over true optimal controls which
may not exist. So our set value, not the raw set value, is the natural extension of the stan-
dard value function in control theory. Moreover, since we are considering infinitely many
players, an approximate equilibrium means it is approximately optimal for most players,
but possibly with a small portion of exceptions, as introduced in Carmona [9].
Finally we would like to mention some other approaches for mean field games with
multiple equilibriums. One is to add some noise so that the new game will become non-
degenerate and hence have unique mean field equilibrium, see e.g. Bayraktar-Cecchin-
Cohen-Delarue [3, 4], Delarue [16], Delarue-Foguen Tchuendom [17], Foguen Tchuendom
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[24]. Another approach is to study a special type of mean field equilibriums, see e.g.
Cecchin-Dai Pra-Fisher-Pelino [13], Cecchin-Delarue [14], and [17].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the set value
for a mean field game in discrete time on finite state space and establish the dynamic
programming principle, and in Section 3 we prove the convergence for the corresponding
N -player games with homogeneous equilibriums. Sections 4 and 5 are devoted to mean
field games with relaxed controls and the corresponding N -player games with heterogenous
equilibriums. In Section 6 we study a diffusion model. Finally in Appendix we provide
some discussion on the subtle path dependence issue and complete some technical results.
2 Mean field games on finite space with closed-loop controls
In this section we consider a Mean Field Game (MFG) on finite space (both time and state)
with closed-loop controls, and for simplicity we restrict to state dependent setting. Since
the game typically has multiple Mean Field Equilibriums (MFE) which may induce different
values, we shall introduce the set value of the game over all MFEs. Our goal is to establish
the Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) for the MFG set value, and we shall show in
the next section that the set values of the corresponding N -player games converge to the
MFG set value. We emphasize that the DPP would fail if one uses open loop ones.
2.1 The basic setting
Let T := {0, · · · , T} be the set of discrete times; Tt := {t, · · · , T} for t ∈ T; S the finite
state space with size |S| = d; P(S) the set of probability measures on S, equipped with the




|µ(x)− ν(x)|, µ, ν ∈ P(S). (2.1)
Let P0(S) denote the subset of µ ∈ P(S) which has full support, namely µ(x) > 0 for
all x ∈ S. Moreover, let A ⊂ Rd0 be a measure set for the values of controls; and q :
T× S× P(S)× A× S → (0, 1) be a transition probability function:
∑
x̃∈S
q(t, x, µ, a; x̃) = 1, ∀(t, x, µ, a) ∈ T× S× P(S)× A.
We shall use the weak formulation which is more convenient for closed-loop controls.
That is, we fix the canonical space and consider controlled probability measures on it. To
be precise, let Ω := X := ST+1 be the canonical space; X : T×Ω → S the canonical process:
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Xt(ω) = ωt; F := {Ft}t∈T := FX the filtration generated by X; and Astate the set of state
dependent admissible controls α : T× S → A. Introduce the concatenation for controls:
(α⊕T0 α̃)s := αs1{s<T0} + α̃s1{s≥T0}, α, α̃ ∈ Astate. (2.2)
It is clear that α ⊕T0 α̃ ∈ Astate. Given (t, µ, α) ∈ T × P(S) × Astate, let Pt,µ,α denote the
probability measure on FT determined recursively by: for s = t, · · · , T ,
P
t,µ,α ◦X−1t = µ, Pt,µ,α(Xs+1 = x̃|Xs = x) = q(s, x, µαs , α(s, x); x̃);
where µαs := P
t,µ,α ◦X−1s .
(2.3)
We note that {µαs }s∈Tt are uniquely determined and X is a Markov chain on Tt under Pt,µ,α.
However, the distribution of {Xs}s=0,··· ,t−1 is not specified and is irrelevant, and {αs}0≤s<t
is also irrelevant. Moreover, given {µ·} := {µs}s∈Tt , x ∈ S, and α̃ ∈ Astate, let P{µ·};t,x,α̃
denote the probability measure on FT determined recursively by: for s = t, · · · , T − 1,
P
{µ·};t,x,α̃(Xt = x) = 1, P
{µ·};t,x,α̃(Xs+1 = x̄|Xs = x̃) = q(s, x̃, µs, α̃(s, x); x̄). (2.4)
As in the standard MFG literature, here we are assuming the population uses the common
control α while the individual player is allowed to use a different control α̃.
We remark that, since we assume q > 0, then for any (t, µ) and α, µαs ∈ P0(S) for all
s > t. For the convenience of presentation, in this section we shall restrict our discussion to
the case µ ∈ P0(S). The general case that the initial measure µ is not fully supported can
be treated fairly easily, as we will do in Section 6 below. The situation with degenerate q,
however, is more subtle and we shall leave for future research.
We finally introduce the cost functional for the mean field game: for the µα in (2.3),
J(t, µ, α;x, α̃) := J(µα; t, x, α̃), v({µ·}; s, x) := inf
α̃∈Astate
J({µ·}; s, x, α̃);
where J({µ·}; s, x, α̃) := EP
{µ·};s,x,α̃
[








Here, since T and S are finite, F,G are arbitrary measurable functions satisfying
inf
a∈A
F (t, x, µ, a) > −∞ for all (t, x, µ).
We remark that here v({µ·}; ·, ·) is the value function of a standard stochastic control
problem with parameter {µ·}. In particular, in continuous time models, µα and v(µα; ·, ·)
will satisfy the Fokker-Planck equation and the HJB equation, respectively.
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Definition 2.1 Given (t, µ) ∈ T× P0(S), we say α∗ ∈ Astate is a state dependent MFE at
(t, µ), denoted as α∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ), if
J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗) = v(µα
∗
; t, x), for all x ∈ S. (2.6)
In this and the next section, we may use the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.2 (i) q ≥ cq for some constant cq > 0;
(ii) q is Lipschitz continuous in (µ, a), with a Lipschitz constant Lq;
(iii) F,G are uniformly continuous in (µ, a), with a modulus of continuity function ρ.
2.2 The raw set value V0
We introduce the raw set value for the MFG over all state dependent MFEs:
V0(t, µ) :=
{
J(t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗) : α∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ)
}
⊂ L0(S;R). (2.7)
Here the elements of V0(t, µ) are functions from S to R, which coincide with R
d by identifying
ϕ ∈ L0(S;R) with (ϕ(x) : x ∈ S) ∈ Rd. We call V0(t, µ) the raw set value and we will
introduce the set value V(t, µ) of the MFG in the next subsection.
Next, for any T0 ∈ Tt, ψ ∈ L0(S× P0(S);R), we introduce the MFG on {t, · · · , T0}:















In the obvious sense we define α∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, ψ; t, µ) by:
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗;x, α∗) = v(T, ψ;µα
∗
; t, x) := inf
α̃∈Astate
J(T, ψ; t, µ, α∗;x, α̃), ∀x ∈ S. (2.9)
At below we will repeatedly use the following simple fact due to the tower property of
conditional expectations:
J(t, µ, α;x, α̃) = J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α;x, α̃), where ψ(y, ν) := J(T0, ν, α; y, α̃). (2.10)
The following time consistency of MFE is the essence of the DPP for the raw set value.
Proposition 2.3 Fix 0 ≤ t < T0 ≤ T and µ ∈ P0(S). For any α∗, α̃∗ ∈ Astate, denote
α̂∗ := α∗ ⊕T0 α̃∗ and ψ(y, ν) := J(T0, ν, α̃∗; y, α̃∗). Then α̂∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ) if and only if
α∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, ψ; t, µ) and α̃∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, µα∗T0 ).
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For arbitrary α ∈ Astate and x ∈ S, by (2.10) we have















































= J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗;x, α) ≥ J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗;x, α∗) = J(t, µ, α̂∗;x, α̂∗),
where the first inequality is due to α̃∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, µα∗T0 ) and the second inequality is due
to α∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, ψ; t, µ). Then α̂∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ).
(ii) We now prove the only if part. Let α̂∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ). For any α ∈ Astate, we have
α⊕T0 α̃∗ ∈ Astate. Then, since α̂∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ), for any x ∈ S, by (2.10) we have
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗;x, α∗) = J(t, µ, α̂∗;x, α̂∗) ≤ J(t, µ, α̂∗;x, α⊕T0 α̃∗) = J(T, ψ; t, µ, α∗;x, α).
This implies that α∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, ψ; t, µ).





































































On the other hand, by definition v(µα̂
∗
;T0, x̃) ≤ J(T0, µα
∗
T0











Since q > 0, then clearly Pµ




∗; x̃, α̃∗) = v(µα̂
∗
;T0, x̃), ∀x̃ ∈ S.




We then have the following dynamic programing principle.
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Theorem 2.4 For any 0 ≤ t < T0 ≤ T , and µ ∈ P0(S), we have
V0(t, µ) :=
{
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗; ·, α∗) : for all ψ ∈ L0(S× P0(S);R) and α∗ ∈ Astate
such that ψ(·, µα∗T0 ) ∈ V0(T0, µα
∗
T0 ) and α




Proof Let Ṽ0(t, µ) denote the right side of (2.12). First, for any J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗; ·, α∗) ∈
Ṽ0(t, µ) with desired ψ,α
∗ as in (2.12). Since ψ(·, µα∗T0 ) ∈ V0(T0, µα
∗
T0




) such that ψ(·, µα∗T0 ) = J(T0, µα
∗
T0
, α̃∗; ·, α̃∗). By Proposition 2.3 α̂∗ := α∗ ⊕T0
α̃∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ). Then, by (2.10), J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗) = J(t, µ, α̂∗; ·, α̂∗) ∈ V0(t, µ), and
thus Ṽ0(t, µ) ⊂ V0(t, µ).
On the other hand, let J(t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗) ∈ V0(t, µ) with α∗ ∈ Mstate(t, µ). Introduce
ψ(x, ν) := J(T0, ν, α
∗;x, α∗). By Proposition 2.3 again we see that α∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, ψ; t, µ)
and α∗ ∈ Mstate(T0, µα
∗
T0




by the definition of Ṽ0(t, µ) that J(t, µ, α
∗; ·, α∗) = J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗) ∈ Ṽ0(t, µ). That
is, V0(t, µ) ⊂ Ṽ0(t, µ).
2.3 The set value Vstate
While Theorem 2.4 is elegant, the raw set value V0(t, µ) is very sensitive to the small
perturbation of the coefficients F,G and the variable µ. Indeed, even the measurability of
the subset V0(t, µ) ⊂ Rd and the measurability of the mapping µ 7→ V0(t, µ) are not clear.
Moreover, in general it does not look possible to have the convergence of the raw set value
of the corresponding N -player games to V0(t, µ). Therefore, in this subsection we shall
modify V0(t, µ) and introduce the set value Vstate(t, µ) of the MFG as follows.
Definition 2.5 For any (t, µ) ∈ T × P0(S) and ε > 0, let Mεstate(t, µ) denote the set of
α∗ ∈ Astate such that
J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗) ≤ v(µα∗ ; t, x) + ε, for all x ∈ S. (2.13)











ϕ ∈ L0(S;R) : ‖ϕ− J(t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗)‖∞ ≤ ε for some α∗ ∈ Mεstate(t, µ)
}
.
Recall (2.5), then (2.13) and (2.14) imply that
0 ≤ J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)− v(µα∗ ; t, x) ≤ ε, ‖ϕ− v(µα∗ ; t, ·)‖∞ ≤ 2ε. (2.15)
So we may alternatively define Vεstate(t, µ) by using ‖ϕ− v(µα
∗
; t, ·)‖∞ ≤ ε.
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;t,x,α = Pt,x,α does not depend on µ and α∗. Let











denote the value function of the standard stochastic control problem. One can easily see that,
when there exists an optimal control α∗, then V0(t, µ) = Vstate(t, µ) = {V (t, ·)}. However,
when there is no optimal control, then we still have Vstate(t, µ) = {V (t, ·)} but V0(t, µ) = ∅.
So Vstate, not V0, is the natural extension of the value function V .
(ii) We remark that
⋂
ε>0Mεstate(t, µ) = Mstate(t, µ), however, in general it is possible
that Vstate(t, µ) is strictly larger than V0(t, µ). Indeed, Vstate(t, µ) can be larger than the
closure of V0(t, µ), where the latter is still empty when there is no optimal control.
Similarly, given T0 and ψ, Mεstate(T0, ψ; t, µ) denotes the set of α∗ ∈ Astate such that
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗;x, α∗) ≤ inf
α∈Astate
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗;x, α) + ε, ∀ x ∈ S. (2.16)
The dynamic programing principle remains true for Vstate, but under some modification.





ϕ ∈ L0(S;R) : ‖ϕ− J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗)‖∞ ≤ ε
for some ψ ∈ L0(S× P0(S);R) and α∗ ∈ Astate such that
ψ(·, µα∗T0 ) ∈ Vεstate(T0, µα
∗
T0




The theorem can be proved by modifying the arguments in Theorem 2.4 and Proposition
2.3. However, since the proof is very similar to that of Theorem 4.2 below, except that the
latter is in the more complicated path dependent setting, we thus postpone it to Appendix.
3 The N-player game with homogeneous equilibriums
In this section we study the N -player game whose set value will converge to Vstate.
3.1 The N-player game
Set ΩN := XN with canonical processes ~X = (X1, · · · ,XN ), where Xi stands for the state










δxi ∈ P(S), for ~x = (x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ SN . (3.1)
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The player i will have control αi. In the literature, a closed loop control αi typically depends
on the full information ~X . However, since we are talking about large N , in practice it may
not be feasible for each player to observe all other players’ states individually. Moreover,
in the MFG setting the population state is characterized by its distribution, not by each
player’s individual state. So in this section we consider only symmetric controls, namely αi
depends on his/her own state Xi and on the others through the empirical measure µN .
For technical reasons, we introduce another parameter L ≥ 0. Denote
ALstate :=
{
α : T× S× P(S) → A :
∣
∣α(t, x, µ) − α(t, x, ν)
∣





L≥0ALstate. Given t ∈ T, ~x ∈ SN , and ~α = (α1, · · · , αN ) ∈ (A∞state)N , let
P
t,~x,~α denote the probability measure on F ~XT determined recursively by: for s = t, · · · , T−1,
P
t,~x,~α( ~Xt = ~x) = 1, P
t,~x,~α( ~Xs+1 = ~x












and the cost function of Player i is:

















Remark 3.1 (i) It is obvious that A0state = Astate for the Astate in the previous subsection.
For the MFG, there is no need to consider A∞state. Indeed, given (t, µ) ∈ T×P0(S), for any
α ∈ A∞state, let Pt,µ,α be defined as in (2.3): again denoting µαs := Pt,µ,α ◦X−1s ,
P
t,µ,α ◦X−1t = µ, Pt,µ,α(Xs+1 = x̃|Xs = x) = q(s, x, µαs , α(s, x, µαs ); x̃).
Introduce α̃(s, x) := α(s, x, µαs ). Then α̃ ∈ Astate and one can easily verify that µα̃ = µα.
In particular, the set value Vstate(t, µ) will remain the same by allowing α ∈ A∞state. For the
N -player game, however, since µN is random, the dependence on µN makes the difference.





, rather than µNt , in (3.3)
and (3.4). The convergence results in this section will remain true if we use µN,−i instead.
However, we find it more convenient to use µNt .
There is another crucial issue concerning the controls. Note that an MFE requires by
definition that each player takes the same control α∗. To achieve the desired convergence,
for the N -player game it is natural to consider only the homogeneous equilibriums: α1 =
· · · = αN , which we will do in the rest of this section. We note that, for a homogeneous
control α, the Pt,~x,α := Pt,~x,(α,··· ,α) in (3.3) and Ji(t, ~x, α) := Ji(t, ~x, (α, · · · , α)) in (3.4) are





,α, Ji(t, ~x, α) = J
N (t, xi, µ
N
~x , α). (3.5)
11
Definition 3.2 For any ε > 0, L ≥ 0, we say α∗ ∈ ALstate is a homogeneous state dependent
(ε, L)-equilibrium of the N -player game at (t, ~x), denoted as α∗ ∈ MN,ε,Lstate (t, ~x), if:
Ji(t, ~x, α
∗) ≤ vN,Li (t, ~x, α∗) := inf
α̃∈ALstate
Ji(t, ~x, (α
∗, α̃)i) + ε, i = 1, · · · , N,
where (α, α̃)i denote the vector ~α such that α
i = α̃ and αj = α for all j 6= i.
(3.6)
In light of (3.5), clearly MN,ε,Lstate (t, ~x) is law invariant: MN,ε,Lstate (t, ~x) = MN,ε,Lstate (t, ~x′) when-
ever µN~x = µ
N
~x′ . Thus, by abusing the notation, we may denoteM
N,ε,L
state (t, ~x) = MN,ε,Lstate (t, µN~x )
and call such α a homogeneous state dependent (ε, L)-equilibrium at (t, µN~x ).
Note again that q > 0, then similar to Subsection 2.1, for convenience in this section we





~x ∈ SN : µN~x ∈ P0(S)
}
, PN (S) :=
{
µN~x : ~x ∈ SN0
}
⊂ P0(S). (3.7)















state (t, µ), ∀(t, µ) ∈ T× PN (S), where
V
N,ε,L
state (t, µ) :=
{




3.2 Convergence of the empirical measures
Theorem 3.3 Let Assumption 2.2 (ii) hold. Then, for any L ≥ 0, there exists a constant
CL, which depends only on T, d, Lq, and L such that, for any t ∈ T, ~x ∈ SN0 , µ ∈ P0(S),




W1(µNs , µαs )
]







t,~x,(α,α̃)i ◦ (Xis)−1, Pµ
α;t,xi,α̃ ◦X−1s
)
≤ CLθN . (3.10)
Proof We first recall Remark 3.1 and extend all the notations in Subsection 2.1 to those
α ∈ ALstate in the obvious sense. Fix t, i and denote PN := Pt,~x,(α,α̃)i .
Step 1. We first prove (3.9) for s = t + 1. Note that X1t+1, · · · ,XNt+1 are independent
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N (Xit+1 = x̃)− µαt+1(x̃)
∣
∣.























q(t, x, µN~x , α(t, x, µ
N
~x ); x̃)1{xj=x} + q(t, x, µ
N






















q(t, x, µN~x , α(t, x, µ
N
~x ); x̃)1{xj=x} −
∑
x∈S










∣q(t, x, µN~x , α(t, x, µ
N



































+ CLθN ≤ CLθN .












































Since T is finite, by induction we obtain (3.9) immediately.




N ◦ (Xis)−1, Pi ◦X−1s
)
where Pi := Pµ
α;t,xi,α̃.















































































































N (Xis = x)− Pi(Xs = x)
∣
∣
≤ CLθN + κs,
where the last inequality thanks to (3.9). Now by induction one can easily prove (3.10).
3.3 Convergence of the set values
We first study the convergence of the cost functions. Recall the θN in (3.9) and the functions
v in (2.5) and vN,Li in (3.6).
Theorem 3.4 Let Assumption 2.2 (ii) and (iii) hold. For any L ≥ 0, there exists a modulus
of continuity function ρL, which depends only on T, d, Lq, ρ, and L such that, for any t ∈ T,
µN~x ∈ PN (S), µ ∈ P0(S), and any α, α̃ ∈ ALstate, i = 1, · · · , N ,
∣






i (t, ~x, α)− v(µα; t, xi)
∣
∣ ≤ ρL(θN ). (3.12)
Proof Clearly the uniform estimates for J implies that for v, so we shall only prove the




























































, s < T.
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This, together with (3.9), implies (3.12) for some appropriately defined modulus of conti-
nuity function ρL.
Our main result of this section is the following convergence of the set values. Recall, for



















































~x ), actually equalities hold.





in the left side, or the order of limN→∞ and
⋂
ε>0 in the right side.
Proof (i) We first prove the right inclusion in (3.13). Fix ϕ ∈ Vstate(t, µ), ε > 0, and
set ε1 :=
ε
2 . Note that Astate = A0state. By (2.14), there exists α∗ ∈ M
ε1
state(t, µ) such that
‖ϕ− J(t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗)‖∞ ≤ ε1. Recall (2.13), we have
J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗) ≤ v(µα∗ ; t, x) + ε1, for all x ∈ S.
For any α ∈ A0state = Astate, by Theorem 3.4 we have
Ji(t, ~x, α
∗) ≤ J(t, µ, α∗;xi, α∗) + ρ0(θN )
≤ v(µα∗ ; t, x) + ε1 + ρ0(θN ) ≤ vN,Li (t, ~x, α∗) + ε1 + 2ρ0(θN ).
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Choose N large enough such that ρ0(θN ) ≤ ε4 , then Ji(t, ~x, α∗) ≤ v
N,L
i (t, ~x, α
∗) + ε. This
implies that α∗ ∈ MNε,0(t, µN~x ). Moreover,



















ϕ ∈ Vstate(t, µ) and ε > 0 are arbitrary, we obtain the right inclusion in (3.13).












ε > 0. Then, for ε1 :=
ε
2 > 0, there exist Lε > 0 and an infinite sequence {Nk}k≥1
such that ϕ ∈ VNk,ε1,Lεstate (t, µNk~x ) for all k ≥ 1. Recall (3.8), for each k ≥ 1 there exists
αk ∈ MNk ,ε1,Lεstate (t, µNk~x ) such that ‖ϕ− JN (t, ·, µ
Nk
~x , α
k)‖∞ ≤ ε1. By Definition 3.2, we have
Ji(t, ~x, α
k) ≤ vNk ,Lεi (t, ~x, αk) + ε1. Similar to (i), by Theorem 3.4 we have
J(t, µ, αk;xi, α
k) ≤ v(µαk ; t, xi) + ε1 + 2ρLε(θNk) ≤ v(µα
k
; t, xi) + ε,
for k large enough. That is, αk ∈ Mεstate(t, µ). Similar to (i) again, for k large enough we
have ‖ϕ−J(t, µ, αk ; ·, αk)‖∞ ≤ ε. Then ϕ ∈ Vεstate(t, µ). Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain
ϕ ∈ Vstate(t, µ), and hence derive the left inclusion in (3.13).
Remark 3.6 (i) From Theorem 3.5 (i) we see that, for any α∗ ∈ M
ε
2
state(t, µ), we have
α∗ ∈ MN,ε,0state (t, µN~x ) when N is large enough. Moreover, by (3.9) we have the desired estimate
for the approximate equilibrium measure EP




≤ CLθN . This verifies the
standard result in the literature that an approximate MFE is an approximate equilibrium of
the N -player game.






~x ), we have α
k ∈
Mεstate(t, µ) when k is large enough, and we again have the estimate for the approximate
equilibrium measure EP




≤ CLθNk . This is in the spirit that any limit
point of the N -player equilibrium measures is an MFE measure.
(iii) As we saw above, we have the desired convergence both for set values and for the
equilibriums measures. This type of convergence holds true for open loop controls, see [26],
and for closed loop controls under monotonicity conditions (and hence the MFE is unique),
see e.g. [8]. However, for general mean field game with closed loop controls, to our best
knowledge our result is the first one which has the convergence.
Remark 3.7 (i) We should point out that, our main trick to obtain the convergence is
to consider homogeneous equilibriums for the N -player games. If we use heterogeneous
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equilibriums for the N -player games, it turns out that we will have the desired convergence
when we consider relaxed controls for the MFG, as we will do in the next two sections.
(ii) Another technical trick we are using is the uniform Lipschitz continuity require-
ment. The convergence analysis will become more subtle when we remove such regularity
requirement, see e.g. [27].
(iii) We would also like to point out that in general it could be easier to analyze the
set values than the equilibriums, especially when we do not require the regularities of the
controls. One trivial example is that F and G are constants, then the set value is a singleton
of constant value, while the equilibriums are arbitrary admissible controls.
4 Mean field games on finite space with relaxed controls
In this section we study MFG with relaxed controls, or say mixed strategies. Besides its in-
dependent interest, our main motivation is to characterize the limit of N -player games with
heterogeneous equilibriums. We shall still consider the finite space in Section 2, however,
for the purpose of generality in this section we consider path dependent setting.
4.1 The relaxed set value with path dependent controls
We start with some notations for the path dependent setting. For x = (xt)0≤t≤T ∈ X, denote
by xt∧· = (x0, · · · ,xt,xt, · · · ,xt) the path stopping at t and Xt := {xt∧· : x ∈ X} ⊂ X.
For x, x̃ ∈ X, we say x =t x̃ if xt∧· = x̃t∧·. Denote Xt,x := {x̃ ∈ X : x̃ =t x} and
X
t,x
s := Xt,x ∩ Xs, for s ≥ t. Introduce the concatenation x⊕t x̃ ∈ X by
(x⊕t x̃)s := xs1{s≤t} + x̃s1{s>t}, and (x⊕t x)s := xs1{s≤t} + x1{s>t}, x ∈ S.




|µ(x)− ν(x)|, ∀µ, ν ∈ P(Xt),
and P0(Xt) the subset of µ ∈ P(Xt) with full support Xt. Again this is just for convenience
of presentation. For a measure µ ∈ P(X) = P(XT ), denote µt∧· := µ ◦ X−1t∧· ∈ P(Xt).
We remark that, by abusing the notation µ, here µt∧· denote the joint law of the stopped
process Xt∧·, while in Section 2 {µ·} denote the family of marginal laws.
For a path dependent function ϕ on T× X × P(X), we say ϕ is adapted if ϕ(t,x, µ) =
ϕ(t,xt∧·, µt∧·). Throughout this section, all the path dependent functions are required to
be adapted. In particular, the data of the game q : T × X × P(X) × A × S → (0, 1),
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F : T×X×P(X)×A → R, and G : X×P(X) → R are path dependent with q, F adapted.
By adapting to the path dependent setting, we shall still assume Assumption 2.2.
Let Arelax denote the set of path dependent adapted relaxed controls γ : T×X → P(A).
Given t ∈ T, µ ∈ P(Xt), γ ∈ Arelax, and x ∈ Xt, x̃ ∈ Xt,x, γ̃ ∈ Arelax, we introduce:
P
t,µ,γ ◦X−1t∧· = µ, Pt,µ,γ(Xs+1 = x̃|X =s x) =
∫
A
q(s,x, µγ , a; x̃)γ(s,x; da);
where µγs∧· := P
t,µ,γ ◦X−1s∧·, s ≥ t;
P
µγ ;t,x,γ̃(X =t x) = 1, P
µγ ;t,x,γ̃(Xs+1 = x̄|X =s x̃) =
∫
A
q(s, x̃, µγ , a; x̄)γ̃(s, x̃; da);
















J(t, µ, γ;x, γ̃) := J(µγ ; t,x, γ̃), v(µγ ; s, x̃) := inf
γ̃∈Arelax
J(µγ ; s, x̃, γ̃).
(4.1)
Definition 4.1 For any t ∈ T, µ ∈ P0(Xt), and ε > 0, let Mεrelax(t, µ) denote the set of
relaxed ε-MFE γ∗ ∈ Arelax such that
J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗) ≤ v(µγ∗ ; t,x) + ε, for all x ∈ Xt. (4.2)













ϕ ∈ L0(Xt;R) : ∃γ∗ ∈ Mεrelax(t, µ) s.t. ‖ϕ− J(t, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗)‖Xt ≤ ε
}
.
Similarly, given T0 and ψ : XT0 × P(XT0) → R, as in (2.8) define












F (s,X, µγ , a)γ̃(s,X, da)
]
, (4.4)
and let Mεrelax(T0, ψ; t, µ) denote the set of γ∗ ∈ Arelax such that
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ
∗;x, γ∗) ≤ v(T, ψ;µγ ; s, x̃) := inf
γ∈Arelax
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ
∗;x, γ) + ε, ∀x ∈ Xt.(4.5)
Note that the tower property in (2.10) remains true for relaxed controls:
J(t, µ, γ;x, γ̃) = J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ;x, γ̃), where ψ(y, ν) := J(T0, ν, γ;y, γ̃). (4.6)
The dynamic programing principle for Vrelax takes the following form.





ϕ ∈ L0(Xt;R) : ‖ϕ− J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗)‖Xt ≤ ε
for some ψ ∈ L0(XT0 × P0(XT0);R) and γ∗ ∈ Arelax such that










Proof We shall follow the arguments in Theorem 2.4, in particular, we shall extend




relax(t, µ) denote the right side of (4.7).
(i) We first prove Ṽrelax(t, µ) ⊂ Vrelax(t, µ). Fix ϕ ∈ Ṽrelax(t, µ), ε > 0, and set ε1 := ε4 .
Since ϕ ∈ Ṽε1relax(t, µ), then
‖ϕ− J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗)‖Xt ≤ ε1 for some desirable ψ, γ∗ as in (4.7).




T0∧·), there exists γ̃
∗ ∈ Mε1relax(T0, µ
γ∗
T0∧·) such that
‖ψ(·, µγ∗T0∧·)− J(T0, µ
γ∗
T0∧·, γ̃
∗; ·, γ̃∗)‖XT0 ≤ ε1.
As in (2.2) denote γ̂∗ := γ∗⊕T0 γ̃∗ := γ∗1{s<T0} + γ̃∗1{s≥T0} ∈ Arelax. Then, for any x ∈ Xt
and γ ∈ Arelax, similarly to Proposition 2.3 (i) we have





















































= J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ





































= J(t, µ, γ̂∗;x, γ̂∗)− 4ε1 = J(t, µ, γ̂∗;x, γ̂∗)− ε.
That is, γ̂∗ ∈ Mεrelax(t, µ). Moreover, note that, by (4.6),
‖ϕ− J(t, µ, γ̂∗; ·, γ̂∗)‖Xt ≤ ε1 + ‖J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗)− J(t, µ, γ̂∗; ·, γ̂∗)‖Xt



















≤ 2ε1 < ε.
Then ϕ ∈ Vεrelax(t, µ). Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain ϕ ∈ Vrelax(t, µ).
(ii) We now prove the opposite inclusion. Fix ϕ ∈ Vrelax(t, µ) and ε > 0. Let ε2 > 0 be
a small number which will be specified later. Since ϕ ∈ Vε2relax(t, µ), then
‖ϕ− J(t, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗)‖Xt ≤ ε2 for some γ∗ ∈ Mε2relax(t, µ).
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Introduce ψ(y, ν) := J(T0, ν, γ
∗;y, γ∗) and recall (2.10). Then
‖ϕ − J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗)‖Xt = ‖ϕ(x) − J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗)‖Xt ≤ ε2.
Moreover, since γ∗ ∈ Mε2relax(t, µ), for any γ ∈ Arelax and x ∈ Xt, we have
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ
∗;x, γ∗) = J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗)
≤ J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ ⊕T0 γ∗) + ε2 = J(T0, ψ; t, µ, γ∗;x, γ) + ε2.
This implies that γ∗ ∈ Mε2relax(T0, ψ; t, µ). We claim further that





for some constant C ≥ 1. Then by (2.17) we see that ϕ ∈ ṼCε2relax(t, µ) ⊂ Ṽεrelax(t, µ) by
setting ε2 ≤ εC . Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain ϕ ∈ Ṽrelax(t, µ).



















= J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗)− J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗ ⊕T0 γ) ≤ ε2.


















+ ε2, ∀x ∈ Xt.
On the other hand, it is obvious that v(µγ
∗
;T0, x̃) ≤ J(T0, µγ
∗
T0∧·, γ
∗; x̃, γ∗) for all x̃ ∈ XT0 .
Moreover, since q ≥ cq, clearly Pµγ
∗
;t,x,γ∗(X =T0 x̃) ≥ cT0−tq , for any x̃ ∈ Xt,xT0 . Thus,
0 ≤ J(T0, µγ
∗
T0∧·, γ























where C := ct−T0q . This implies that γ
∗ ∈ MCε2relax(T0, µ
γ∗
T0∧·). Then (4.8) follows directly
from ψ(·, µγ∗T0∧·) = J(T0, µ
γ∗
T0∧·, γ
∗; ·, γ∗), and hence ϕ ∈ Ṽrelax(t, µ).
Remark 4.3 Consider the setting that q, F,G are state dependent, as in Section 2. There
is a very subtle issue between state dependence and path dependence of the controls.
(i) For a standard non-zero sum game problems where the players may have different
cost functions Fi, Gi, if one uses state dependent controls, in general the set value does not
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satisfy DPP. See a counterexample in [21]. However, with path dependent controls the set
value of the game will satisfy the DPP.
(ii) In Section 2, since all players have the same cost function, as we see the set value
with state dependent controls satisfy DPP. If we consider path dependent controls α ∈ Apath,
the set value will also satisfy DPP. However, the set values are in general not equal, see
Example 7.1 below for a counterexample.
(iii) For relaxed controls in this section, again restricting to state dependent q, F,G, it
turns out that the state dependence and the path dependence will lead to the same set value.
See Theorem 7.4 below. The main reason is that the convex combination of relaxed controls
remains a relaxed control. Such property is not shared by the controls α in Section 2.
4.2 An alternative formulation of the relaxed mean field game
In this subsection we provide an alternative formulation for the MFG with relaxed controls,
which is also crucial for the convergence result in the next section.
Let Apath denote the set of adapted path dependent controls α : T × X → A, and for
each t ∈ T, Atpath =
{
(α(t, ·), · · · , α(T − 1, ·)) : α ∈ Apath
}
. Denote Ξt := P(Xt × Atpath),
and for each Λ ∈ Ξt, define recursively: for s ≥ t, x ∈ Xt, and x̃ ∈ Xt,x,







q(r, x̃, µΛ, α(r, x̃); x̃r+1)Λ(x, dα). (4.9)
Here, noting that α ∈ Atpath can be equivalently expressed as {α(s, x̃) : t ≤ s ≤ T − 1, x̃ ∈
X
t,x



















Next, for µ ∈ P0(Xt), denote Ξt(µ) := {Λ ∈ Ξt : µΛt∧· = µ}. Moreover, recall (4.1),
J(t,Λ;x, α) := J(µΛ; t,x, α), v(t,Λ;x) := v(µΛ; t,x), x ∈ Xt, α ∈ Atpath. (4.11)
To simplify the notations, we introduce:




q(r, x̃, µ, α(r, x̃); x̃r+1). (4.12)





Λ; x̃, α)Λ(x, dα), Pµ
Λ;t,x,α(X =s x̃) = Q
t
s(µ
Λ; x̃, α). (4.13)
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Definition 4.4 For any t ∈ T, µ ∈ P0(Xt), and ε > 0, we call Λ∗ ∈ Ξt(µ) a global ε-MFE




[J(t,Λ∗;x, α) − v(t,Λ∗;x)]Λ∗(x, dα) ≤ ε, ∀x ∈ Xt. (4.14)
Note that the α above is global in time, so we call Λ∗ a global equilibrium. Moreover, since
there are infinitely many α ∈ Atpath, it is hard to require J(t,Λ∗;x, α) − v(t,Λ∗;x) ≤ ε for
each α ∈ Atpath, we thus use the above L1-type of optimality condition. For the x part,
however, since there are only finitely many x and each of them has positive probability, we
may require the optimality for each x.
The main result of this subsection is the following equivalence result.
Theorem 4.5 For any t ∈ T and µ ∈ P0(Xt), we have














We shall prove the mutual inclusion of the two sides separately. First, given (t,Λ), we
construct a relaxed control as follows: for any t ∈ T, x ∈ Xt, and s ≥ t, x̃ ∈ Xt,xs ,






Λ; x̃;α)δα(s,x̃)(da)Λ(x, dα). (4.16)
On the opposite direction, given t ∈ T, µ ∈ P0(Xt), γ ∈ Arelax, recalling (4.10) we construct






γ(s, x̃, dα(s, x̃)), ∀x ∈ Xt, α ∈ Atpath. (4.17)



















= µγ . Moreover,






J(t,Λ;x, α)Λ(x, dα), ∀x ∈ Xt. (4.18)
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s∧· by induction. The case s = t follows from the definitions.



















































(s+1)∧·, and we complete the induction argument.




s∧· by induction. Again the case s = t is obviously true. Assume






















































q(r, x̃, µγ , a; x̃r+1)γ(r, x̃, da) = µ
γ
s∧·(x̃).
We finally prove (4.18). For each s ≥ t and x̃ ∈ Xt,xs , by Fubini Theorem again we have
∫
A
F (s, x̃, µΛ, a)γΛ(s, x̃, da) =
∫
A













F (s, x̃, µΛ, α(s, x̃))Qts(µ
Λ; x̃;α)Λ(x, dα)
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By (4.1) we have Pµ
Λ;t,x,γΛ(X =s x̃) =
µΛs∧·(x̃)
µ(x) . Thus






































This implies (4.18) immediately.
Remark 4.7 We can actually show that γ(Λ
γ) = γ for all γ ∈ Arelax, see Appendix. How-
ever, it is not clear that we would have Λ(γ
Λ) = Λ for all Λ ∈ Ξt(µ).
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Since µ ∈ P0(Xt) has full support, denote cµ := infx∈Xt µ(x) > 0.
(i) We first prove Vglobal(t, µ) ⊂ Vrelax(t, µ). Fix ϕ ∈ Vglobal(t, µ) and ε > 0. Let
ε1 > 0 be a small number which will be specified later. Since ϕ ∈ Vε1global(t, µ), there exists
Λ∗ ∈ Mε1global(t, µ) such that ‖ϕ − v(t,Λ∗; ·)‖Xt ≤ ε1. Set γ∗ := γΛ
∗





, by (4.1), (4.11) we have v(µγ
∗
; t,x, γ∗) = v(t,Λ∗;x), and, by (4.18), (4.14),




[J(t,Λ∗;x, α) − v(t,Λ∗;x)]Λ∗(x, dα) ≤ ε1
cµ
≤ ε,
provided ε1 > 0 is small enough. This implies γ
∗ ∈ Mεrelax(t, µ).
Moreover, it is clear now that, for any x ∈ Xt and for a possibly smaller ε1,
∣
∣ϕ(x) − J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗)
∣
∣ ≤ ε1 +
∣
∣v(t,Λ∗;x) − J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗)
∣




Then ϕ ∈ Vεrelax(t, µ), and since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain ϕ ∈ Vrelax(t, µ).
(ii) We next prove Vrelax(t, µ) ⊂ Vglobal(t, µ). Fix ϕ ∈ Vrelax(t, µ), ε > 0, and set ε2 := ε2 .
Since ϕ ∈ Vε2relax(t, µ), there exists γ∗ ∈ Mε2relax(t, µ) such that ‖ϕ−J(t, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗)‖Xt ≤ ε2.






. Since γ∗ ∈ Mε2relax(t, µ), we have
|ϕ(x) − v(t,Λ∗;x)| = |ϕ(x) − v(µγ∗ ; t,x)| ≤ 2ε2 ≤ ε, ∀x ∈ Xt.




[J(t,Λ∗;x, α) − v(t,Λ∗;x)]Λ∗(x, dα)
= µ(x)[J(t, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗)− v(t,Λ∗;x)] ≤ µ(x)ε2 ≤ ε2 ≤ ε.
(4.19)
This implies ϕ ∈ Vεglobal(t, µ), and hence by the arbitrariness of ε, ϕ ∈ Vglobal(t, µ).
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5 The N-player game with heterogeneous equilibriums
In this section we drop the requirement α1 = · · · = αN for the N -player game, and show
that the corresponding set value converges to Vrelax, which in general is strictly larger than
Vstate. We note that we shall still use the pure strategies, rather than mixed strategies, for
the N -player game. Moreover, since we used path dependent controls in Section 4, we shall
also use path dependent controls here.
5.1 The N-player game












i ∈ P(Xt), ~x = (x1, · · · ,xN ) ∈ XNt . (5.1)





~x ∈ XNt : supp (µNt,~x) = Xt
}
, PN (Xt) :=
{
µNt,~x : ~x ∈ XN0,t
}
. (5.2)











α is adapted and
uniformly Lipschitz continuous in µ (under W1) with Lipschitz constant L
}
.
Given t ∈ T, ~x ∈ XN0,t, and ~α = (α1, · · · , αN ) ∈ (At,∞path)N , introduce, for s ≥ t,
P
t,~x,~α( ~X =t ~x) = 1, P
t,~x,~α( ~Xs+1 = ~x




q(s,x′i, µN , αi(s,x′i, µN );x′′i ),
Ji(t, ~x, ~α) := E
Pt,~x,~α
[













−i, α̃), i = 1, · · · , N.
(5.3)
Here (~α−i, α̃) is the vector obtained by replacing αi in ~α with α̃.
Definition 5.1 For any ε > 0, L ≥ 0, we say ~α ∈ (At,Lpath)N is an (ε, L)-equilibrium of the











Here, since there are N players and we will send N → ∞, similar to (4.14) we do not require








































ϕ ∈ L0(Xt;R) : ∃~α ∈ MN,ε,Lhetero(t, ~x) s.t. max1≤i≤N
∣





The following convergence of the set value is in the same spirit of Theorem 3.5.




































~x ), actually equalities hold.
Unlike Theorem 3.5, here the N -player game and the MFG take different types of
controls ~α and γ, respectively. The key for the convergence is the global formulation in
Subsection 4.2 for MFG. Indeed, given t ∈ T, ~x ∈ XN0,t, and ~α ∈ (At,Lpath)N , the N -player
game is naturally related to the following ΛN ∈ P(Xt ×At,Lpath):





δαi(dα), where I(x) :=
{
i = 1, · · · , N : xi = x
}
, x ∈ Xt. (5.8)
By the symmetry of the problem, there exists a function JN , independent of i, such that
Ji(t, ~x, ~α) = J
N (ΛN ; t,xi, αi), i = 1, · · · , N. (5.9)
We shall use this and Theorem 4.5 to prove Theorem 5.2 in the rest of this section. We also




= µNt,~x(x), ∀x ∈ Xt. (5.10)
Remark 5.3 (i) In this section we are using symmetric controls and we obtain the con-
vergence in Theorem 5.2. If we use full information controls αi(t, ~X), as observed in [27]
in terms of the equilibrium measure, one may expect the limit set value will be strictly
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larger than Vrelax. It will be interesting to find an appropriate notion of MFE so that the
corresponding MFG set value will be equal to the above limit, in the sense of Theorem 5.2.
(ii) While the convergence in Theorem 5.2 is about set values, the proofs in the rest of
this section confirm the convergence of the approximate equilibriums as well, exactly in the
same manner as in Remark 3.6.
5.2 From N-player games to mean field games
In this subsection we prove the left inclusion in (5.7). Notice that the ΛN in (5.8) is defined
on At,Lpath, rather than Atpath = A
t,0











N ; x̃, αi(·, ·, νN )), x ∈ Xt, x̃ ∈ Xt,xs , s ≥ t;





δᾱi(dα), where ᾱi(s, x̃) := αi(s, x̃, ν
N ).
(5.11)
Then it is obvious that ᾱi ∈ Atpath and Λ̄N ∈ Ξt(µ). Moreover, when µ = µNt,~x, by (4.13)
and (5.10) it is straightforward to verify by induction that µΛ̄
N
= νN .
Theorem 5.4 Let Assumption 2.2 (ii) hold. Then, for any L ≥ 0, there exists a constant
CL, depending only on T, d, Lq, and L such that, for any t ∈ T, ~x ∈ XN0,t, µ ∈ P0(Xt),
~α ∈ (At,Lpath)N , α̃ ∈ A
t,L
path, and for the ν























, where PN := Pt,~x,(~α
−i,α̃). (5.13)
Indeed, for s ≥ t, by the conditional independence of {Xjs+1}1≤j≤N under PN , conditional



































































q(s,x, µN , α̃j(s,x, µ












where in the last inequality, the first term is due to the sum over all j 6= i. Then
























N ;x, ᾱj)q(s,x, ν


















































It is obvious that κt = 0. Then by induction we obtain (5.13).









































































































Obviously k̄t = W1(µ
N
t,~x, µ). Then by induction we have sup
t≤s≤T
κ̄s ≤ CW1(µNt,~x, µ). This,
together with (5.13), implies (5.12) immediately.
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Theorem 5.5 For the setting in Theorem 5.4 and assuming Assumption 2.2 (iii) as well,

















∣ ≤ ρL(θN ). (5.14)




[J(t, Λ̄N ;x, α) − v(t, Λ̄N ;x)]Λ̄N (x, dα) ≤ ε1 + 2ρL(θN ), ∀x ∈ Xt. (5.15)
In particular, if ε1 + 2ρL(θN ) ≤ ε, then Λ̄N ∈ Mεglobal(t, µ).
Proof First, given Theorem 5.4, (5.14) follows from the arguments in Theorem 3.4. Then,

































≤ ρL(θN ) + ε1 + ρL(θN ) = ε1 + 2ρL(θN ),
completing the proof.







ε > 0, and set ε1 :=
ε
2 . Then there exists Lε ≥ 0 and and a sequence Nk → ∞ (possibly
depending on ε) such that ϕ ∈ VNk,ε1,Lε1hetero (t, µ
Nk
~x
), for all k ≥ 1. Now choose k large enough so





i (t, ~x, ~α)
∣
∣ ≤ ε1. By Theorem 5.5 we see that Λ̄Nk ∈ Mεglobal(t, µ) and, by (5.14),
∣















≤ ε1 + ρLε(θN ) ≤ ε.




∣ ≤ ε for all x ∈ Xt. That is, ϕ ∈ Vεglobal(t, µ). Since
ε > 0 is arbitrary, applying Theorem 4.5 we obtain ϕ ∈ Vrelax(t, µ).
5.3 From mean field games to N-player games
We now turn to the right inclusion in (5.7). Fix t ∈ T, ~x ∈ XN0,t, µ ∈ P0(Xt), and γ ∈ Arelax.
Our goal is to construct a desired ~α ∈ (At,0path)N . However, since ~α, or equivalently the
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corresponding ΛN , is discrete, we need to discretize γ first. We note that it is slightly easier
to discretize γ than to discretize a general Λ ∈ Ξt(µ).
First, given ε > 0, there exists a partition A = ∪nεk=0Ak with nε depending on ε (and γ)
such that, for some arbitrarily fixed ak ∈ Ak, k = 0, · · · , nε,
γ(s,x, A0) ≤ ε,∀s ∈ Tt,x ∈ Xs, and |a− ak| ≤ ε,∀a ∈ Ak, k = 1, · · · , nε. (5.16)
Denote by At,εpath the subset of α ∈ A
t,0





γ(s,x, Ak)δak (da). (5.17)
Recall (4.17), we see that supp (Λγ
ε
(x, dα)) = At,εpath ⊂ A
t,0
path for all x ∈ Xt.
Next, recall (5.10) that NµNt,~x(x) = |I(x)| is a positive integer for all x ∈ Xt. Let
Λεt,~x ∈ P(Xt ×A
t,ε
path) be a modification of Λ
γε such that,
Λεt,~x(x,At,εpath) = µNt,~x(x) and NΛεt,~x(x, α) is an integer;
|Λεt,~x(x, α) − Λγ
ε
(x, α)| ≤ 1
N
+ |µNt,~x(x)− µ(x)|;
∀(x, α) ∈ Xt ×At,εpath. (5.18)
Note that, since At,εpath is finite, such a construction is easy.




[NΛεt,~x(x, α)] = NΛ
ε
t,~x(x,At,εpath) = NµNt,~x(x) = |I(x)|,
and each NΛεt,~x(x, α) is an integer. Let I(x) = ∪α∈At,ε
path
I(x, α) be a partition of I(x) such
that |I(x, α)| = NΛεt,~x(x, α). We then set
αi := α, i ∈ I(x, α), (x, α) ∈ Xt ×At,εpath. (5.19)
Let ΛN be the one defined by (5.8) corresponding to this ~α. It is clear that ΛN = Λεt,~x.
Theorem 5.6 (i) Let Assumption 2.2 (ii) hold. Then there exists a constant C0, depending
only on T, d, Lq, such that, for any t ∈ T, ~x ∈ XN0,t, µ ∈ P0(Xt), γ ∈ Arelax, ε > 0, and for











≤ C0ε+ CεθN , (5.20)
where Cε may depend on ε.
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(ii) Assume further Assumption 2.2 (iii), then there exists a modulus of continuity

































, ∀x ∈ Xt. (5.22)














≤ Cε, s = t, · · · , T. (5.23)






























































≤ Cκs + Cε.
Then by induction we have (5.23).







≤ CεθN , s = t, · · · , T. (5.24)
Indeed, κ̄t = W1(µ
N




path and recalling from
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This implies (5.24) immediately.
Finally, combining (5.23), (5.24), and (5.12), we obtain (5.20).
(ii) First, similar to (5.14), by (5.20) we have (5.21) following from the arguments in
Theorem 3.4. Next, for γ ∈ Mεrelax(t, µ), by (4.19) we have Λγ ∈ Mεglobal(t, µ). Then (5.22)
follows from similar arguments as those for (5.15).
Proof of Theorem 5.2: the right inclusion. Fix ϕ ∈ Vrelax(t, µ) and ε > 0. Let ε1 > 0
be a small number which will be specified later. There exists γ ∈ Mε1relax(t, µ) such that







Ji(t, ~x, ~α)− vN,0i (t, ~x, ~α)
]




, ∀x ∈ Xt.
Choose ε1 small enough such that ε1+2ρ0(C0ε1+ε1) < ε. Then, for all N large enough such






Ji(t, ~x, ~α)− vN,0i (t, ~x, ~α)
]
≤ ε. That is, ~α ∈ VN,ε,0hetero(t, µN~x )
for all N large enough. Then, following the same arguments as those in the proof for
the left inclusion, we can easily get ϕ ∈ VN,ε,0hetero(t, µN~x ) for all N large enough, and thus
ϕ ∈ limN→∞VN,ε,0hetero(t, µN~x ). Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we get the desired inclusion.
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6 A diffusion model with state dependent drift controls
In this section we study a diffusion model with closed-loop drift controls, where the distri-
butions of the controlled state process are all equivalent. The volatility control case involves
mutually singular measures (corresponding to degenerate q in the discrete setting) and is
much more challenging. We shall leave that for future research. We will consider state
dependent controls only, and to ensure the convergence we consider homogeneous controls
for the N -player games.
6.1 The mean field game and the dynamic programming principle
Let T > 0 be a fixed terminal time, (Ω,F ,F = {Ft}0≤t≤T ,P) a filtered probability space
where F0 is atomless; B a d-dimensional Brownian motion; and the set A ⊂ Rd0 a Borel
measurable set. The state process X will also take values in Rd. Its law lies in the space
P2 := P2(Rd) equipped with the 2-Wasserstein distance W2. We remark that in the finite
state space case W1 and W2 are equivalent, while in diffusion models they are not. In
fact, at below we shall require W1-regularity, which is stronger than the W2-regularity, and
obtain W1-convergence, which is weaker than the W2-convergence. This is not surprising
in the mean field literature, see, e.g. [29]. The main advantage of the W1-distance is the
following well known representation: for any µ, µ̃ ∈ P1(Rd),




ϕ(x)[µ(dx) − µ̃(dx)] : ϕ ∈ CLip(Rd) s.t. |ϕ(x)− ϕ(x̃)| ≤ |x− x̃|
}
.(6.1)
Moreover, for each (t, µ) ∈ [0, T ]×P2, let L2(t, µ) denote the set of Ft-measurable random
variables ξ whose law (under P) Lξ = µ.
We consider coefficients (b, f) : [0, T ] × Rd × P2 × A → (Rd,R) and g : Rd × P2 → R.
Throughout this section, the following assumptions will always be in force.
Assumption 6.1 (i) b, f, g are Borel measurable in t and bounded (for simplicity);
(ii) b, f, g are uniformly Lipschitz continuous in (x, µ, a) with a Lipschitz constant L0,
where the Lipschitz continuity in µ is under W1.
Let Acont denote the set of admissible controls α : [0, T ]×Rd → A which is measurable
in t and Lipschitz continuous in x, with the Lipschitz constant Lα possibly depending on
α. Given (t, µ) ∈ [0, T ]×P2, ξ ∈ L2(t, µ), and α ∈ Acont, consider the Mckean-Vlasov SDE:







r ))dr +Bs −Bt, µαs := LXt,ξ,αs . (6.2)
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By the required Lipschitz continuity, the above SDE is wellposed, and it is obvious that
µαt = µ and µ
α
s does not depend on the choice of ξ ∈ L2(t, µ). Then, when only the law is
involved, by abusing the notations we may also denote Xt,ξ,α as Xt,µ,α.
Next, for any x ∈ Rd, and α̃ ∈ Acont, we introduce
J(t, µ, α;x, α̃) := J(µα; t, x, α̃), v(µα; s, x) := inf
α̃∈Acont












l ))dl +Br −Bs, r ≥ s;



















Here we abuse the notations by using the same notations as in the discrete setting. Clearly
u(s, x) := J(µα; s, x, α̃) and v(s, x) := v(µα; s, x) satisfy the following linear PDE and



















b(s, x, µαs , a) · ∂xv(s, x) + f(s, x, µαs , a)
]
= 0;
u(T, x) = v(T, x) = g(x, µαT ).
(6.4)
Definition 6.2 Fix (t, µ) ∈ [0, T ] × P2. For any ε > 0, we say α∗ ∈ Acont is an ε-MFE at




J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)− v(µα∗ ; t, x)
]
µ(dx) ≤ ε. (6.5)
Similar to (5.4) and (5.5), here we do not require α∗ to be optimal for every player x.
Indeed, since there are infinitely many players, we shall tolerate that a small portion of
players may not be happy for the α∗, as in [9], and their possible deviation from α∗ won’t
change the equilibrium measure µα
∗
significantly.
To define the set value, we need the following simple but crucial regularity result, whose
proof is postponed to Appendix.
Lemma 6.3 Let Assumption 6.1 hold. There exists a constant C1 > 0, depending only on
d and the parameters in the assumption, such that, for any t, µ, α, α̃ and s ≥ t,
∣




∣v(µα; s, x)− v(µα; s, x̃)
∣
∣ ≤ C1|x− x̃|, ∀x, x̃. (6.6)























d) denote the set of uniformly Lipschitz continuous functions ϕ : Rd → R. In
particular, since J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗) ≥ v(µα∗ ; t, x), then by (6.6) and (6.5) we see that both
J(t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗) and v(µα∗ ; t, ·) belong to Vcont(t, µ). Moreover, again due to (6.5), we may




∣ϕ(x)− v(µα∗ ; t, x)
∣
∣µ(dx) ≤ ε.
Similarly, given T0 and ψ ∈ CLip(Rd), we may define the functions J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α;x, α̃),
J(T0, ψ;µ
α; s, x, α̃), v(T0, ψ;µ
α; s, x), as well as the sets Mεcont(T0, ψ; t, µ), Vεcont(T0, ψ; t, µ),
Vcont(T0, ψ; t, µ) in the obvious sense. In particular, we have the following tower property:




v(µα; t, x) = v(T0, ψ̃;µ
α; t, x), where ψ̃(x) := v(µα;T0, x).
(6.8)
We now establish the dynamic programming principle for Vcont(t, µ).
Theorem 6.4 Let Assumption 6.1 hold. For any 0 ≤ t ≤ T0 ≤ T and µ ∈ P2, it holds that










ϕ ∈ CLip(Rd) :
∫
Rd
|ϕ(x) − J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)|µ(dx) ≤ ε,
for some (ψ,α) satisfying: ψ ∈ Vεcont(T0, µα
∗
T0




Proof (i) We first prove Vcont(t, µ) ⊂ Ṽcont(t, µ). Fix ϕ ∈ Vcont(t, µ), ε > 0, and set
ε1 :=
ε
2 . Since ϕ ∈ V
ε1
cont(t, µ), there exists α
∗ ∈ Mε1cont(t, µ) satisfying (6.7) for ε1. Denote
ψ(x) := J(T0, µ
α∗
T0 , α
∗;x, α∗), ψ̃(x) := v(µα
∗
;T0, x).
By (6.8) we have J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α




∣ϕ(x)− J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)
∣
∣µ(dx) ≤ ε1 ≤ ε.
We shall show that ψ ∈ Vεcont(T0, µα
∗
T0
) and α∗ ∈ Mεcont(T0, ψ; t, µ). Then ϕ ∈ Ṽεcont(t, µ),
and therefore, since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we have ϕ ∈ Ṽ(t, µ).















[ψ(x) − ψ̃(x)]µα∗T0 (dx) ≤ ε1. (6.10)
Then α∗ ∈ Mεcont(T0, µα
∗
T0
), which, together with the regularity of ψ from Lemma 6.3, implies




To see this, we recall (6.2) with ξ ∈ L2(t, µ). Since α∗ ∈ Mε1cont(t, µ), by (6.8) we have
ε1 ≥ E
[




J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α






J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α


















, then this is exactly (6.10).
Step 2. It remains to show that α∗ ∈ Mεcont(T0, ψ; t, µ). By the definition of v and its
regularity from Lemma 6.3, there exists α̃∗ ∈ Acont such that
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗;x, α̃∗) ≤ v(T0, ψ;µα
∗
; t, x) + ε1, ∀x ∈ Rd.
Then, denoting α̂∗ := α̃∗ ⊕T0 α∗ ∈ Acont, by (6.8) again we have
E
[
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α






J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α










J(t, µ, α∗; ξ, α∗)− v(µα∗ ; t, ξ)
]
+ ε1 ≤ ε1 + ε1 = ε,
This means α∗ ∈ Mεcont(T0, ψ; t, µ).
(ii) We next prove Ṽcont(t, µ) ⊂ Vcont(t, µ). Fix ϕ ∈ Ṽcont(t, µ), ε > 0, and set ε1 := ε2 .
Since ϕ ∈ Ṽε1cont(t, µ), there exist (ψ,α∗) satisfying the desired properties in (6.9) for ε1. In
particular, since ψ ∈ Vε1cont(T0, µα
∗
T0




(6.7) for ε1. Denote α̂
∗ := α∗ ⊕T0 α̃∗ ∈ Acont and
ψ̂(x) := J(T0, µ
α∗
T0
, α̃∗;x, α̃∗), ψ̃(x) := v(µα̂
∗
;T0, x).















≤ ε1 ≤ ε,
where ξ ∈ L2(t, µ). We claim further that α̂∗ ∈ Mεcont(t, µ). Then ϕ ∈ Vεcont(t, µ), and thus
ϕ ∈ Vcont(t, µ), since ε > 0 is arbitrary.
To see the claim, since α∗ ∈ Mεcont(T0, ψ; t, µ), α̃∗ ∈ Mε1cont(T0, µα
∗
T0
), by (6.8) we have
E
[




J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
















J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α










+ ε1 ≤ ε1 + ε1 = ε.
This means α̂∗ ∈ Mεcont(t, µ), and hence completes the proof.
36
6.2 Convergence of the N-player game
By enlarging the filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), if necessary, we let B1, · · · , BN be
independent d-dimensional Brownian motions on it. Set A∞cont := ∪L≥0ALcont, where, for
each L ≥ 0, ALcont denotes the set of admissible controls α : [0, T ]×Rd ×P2 → A such that
|α(t, x, µ) − α(t, x̃, µ̃)| ≤ Lα|x− x̃|+ LW1(µ, µ̃).
Here the Lipschitz constant Lα may depend on α. Note that Acont = A0cont, and by Remark
3.1 (i), all the results in the previous subsection remain true if we replace Acont with A∞cont.
Given t ∈ [0, T ], ~x = (x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ RdN and ~α = (α1, · · · , αN ) ∈ (ALcont)N , consider




















































In light of Lemma 6.3, the following regularity result is interesting in its own right.
However, since it will not be used for our main result, we postpone its proof to Appendix.
Proposition 6.5 Under Assumption 6.1, for any (t, ~x) ∈ [0, T ] × RdN , x̄, x̃ ∈ Rd, and










t, (~x−i, x̃), ~α
)∣
∣ ≤ CL|x̄− x̃|, i = 1, · · · , N. (6.12)
Given α ∈ ALcont, by viewing it as the homogeneous control (α, · · · , α), we may use the
simplified notations Xt,~x,α;i, µt,~x,α, Ji(t, ~x, α), and v
N,L
i (t, ~x, α) in the obvious sense.
Definition 6.6 Fix (t, ~x) ∈ [0, T ]×RdN , ε > 0, L ≥ 0. We say α∗ ∈ ALcont is a homogeneous








∗)− vN,Li (t, ~x, α∗)
]
≤ ε. (6.13)















cont (t, ~x), where (6.14)
V
N,ε,L
cont (t, ~x) :=
{










We remark that, although VN,ε,Lcont (t, ~x) involves only the values {ϕ(xi)}1≤i≤N , for the con-
venience of the convergence analysis we consider its elements as ϕ ∈ CLip(Rd).
Remark 6.7 (i) Recall (3.1). By the involved symmetry, obviously there exist functions
JN , vN,L : [0, T ]× P2 ×ALcont × Rd → R such that
Ji(t, ~x, α) = J
N (t, µN~x , α;xi), v
N,L
i (t, ~x, α) = v
N,L(t, µN~x , α;xi), i = 1, · · · , N. (6.15)
Moreover, VNcont(t, ~x) is invariant in µ
N





(ii) The required inequalities in Definition 6.6 and (6.14) are equivalent to:
∫
Rd




ϕ(x)− JN (t, µN~x , α∗;x)
]
µN~x (dx) ≤ ε.
We now turn to the convergence, and we start with the convergence of the equilibrium
measures. Recall the vector (α, α̃)i introduced in (3.6).
Theorem 6.8 Let Assumption 6.1 hold. There exists a constant CL > 0 such that, for any











≤ CLθN , (6.16)
where θN :=W1(µ
N
~x , µ) +N
− 1





Proof Recall (6.11) and introduce, for j = 1, · · · , N ,
X̃js = xj +
∫ s
t
b(r, X̃jr , µ
α






















r , α(r, X̃r , µ
α
r ))dr +Bs −Bt, where ξ̃ ∈ L2(F0;µN~x ).
(6.17)
Note that X̃1, · · · , X̃N are independent. We proceed the rest of the proof in two steps.
























+ b(r, x, µαs , α(r, x, µ
α
r )) · ∂xu = 0, u(s, x) = ϕ(x). (6.18)
Applying Lemma 6.3 with α̃(r, x) := α(r, x, µαr ) and f = 0, we see that u is uniformly







u(t, ξ̃)− u(t, ξ)
]
≤ CE[|ξ̃ − ξ|].
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Since F0 is atomless, we may choose ξ, ξ̃ such that E[|ξ̃−ξ|] =W1(µN~x , µ), then (2.1) implies
W1(LX̃s , µ
α









≤ CW1(µN~x , µ) + CN−
1
d∨3‖~x‖2 ≤ CθN , t ≤ s ≤ T. (6.19)








. Denote αi := α̃, αj := α for j 6= i, and
β
j




























































































































b(r, x′j , µ
α

















r := xj + B
j
r − Bjt . Note that the terminal condition u(s, ~x′) is Lipschitz continuous
in x′j with Lipschitz constant
1
N . Then, similarly to (6.18), by Lemma 6.3 we see that











































































































+ CLθN ≤ CLθN ,
proving (6.16).
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Proof Fix i. First, by taking supremum over α̃ ∈ ALcont, the uniform estimate for J
implies that for v immediately. So it suffices to prove the former estimate.
For this purpose, recall (6.11) and denote



















Then one can easily see that, by applying Theorem 6.8,
∣
∣Ji(t, ~x, (α, α̃)i)− J̃i(t, ~x, (α, α̃)i)
∣










≤ CLθN . (6.24)
Next, denote
Xis := xi +B
i































s , α̃(s,Xis, µ̃
N,i




















































































































































where the last inequality thanks to Theorem 6.8. Then, by the Grownwall inequality we
obtain E[|∆Ms|2] ≤ CLθ
1
2












This, together with (6.24), implies the estimate for J in (6.23) immediately.




















cont (t, ~x) (6.26)











cont (t, ~x), actually equalities hold.
Proof First, since limN→∞W2(µN~x , µ) = 0, there exists a constant C > 0, which depends
on µ but is independent of N , such that ‖~x‖2 ≤ C.
(i) We first prove the right inclusion in (6.26). Fix ϕ ∈ Vcont(t, µ), ε > 0, and set
ε1 :=
ε
2 . By (6.7) and (6.5), there exists α










∣ϕ(x)− J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)
∣
∣µ(dx) ≤ ε1.




J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)− v(µα∗ ; t, x)
]




∣ϕ(x)− J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)
∣
∣µN~x (dx) ≤ ε1 + CϕW1(µN~x , µ),
















J(t, µ, α∗;xi, α










J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)− v(µα∗ ; t, x)
]
µN~x (dx) + CLθ
1
4




































N ≤ ε1, CL,ϕθ
1
4















|ϕ(xi)− Ji(t, ~x, α∗)| ≤ ε.
41
This implies that α∗ ∈ MN,ε,0cont (t, ~x) and ϕ ∈ VN,ε,0cont (t, ~x), for all N large enough. That is,
ϕ ∈ limN→∞VN,ε,0cont (t, ~x) for any ε > 0.









cont (t, ~x), ε > 0,
and again set ε1 :=
ε
2 . There exist Lε ≥ 0 and an infinite sequence {Nk}k≥1 such that
















|ϕ(xi)− Ji(t, ~x, αk)| ≤ ε1.
Note that Lε is fixed, in particular it is independent of k. In light of Remark 3.1 (i) and






















∣ϕ(x) − J(t, µ, α̃k ;x, α̃k)
∣









J(t, µ, α̃k;x, α̃k)− v(µαk ; t, x)
]










∣ϕ(x)− J(t, µ, α̃k;x, α̃k)
∣































∣ϕ(x)− J(t, µ, α̃k;x, α̃k)
∣
∣µ(dx) ≤ ε.
This implies that α̃k ∈ Mεcont(t, µ) and ϕ ∈ Vεcont(t, µ). Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain
ϕ ∈ Vcont(t, µ).
Remark 6.11 In the same manner as Remark 3.6, we have the convergence of the equilib-
riums as well in the diffusion model of this section.
7 Appendix
7.1 The subtle path dependence issue in Remark 4.3
In this subsection we elaborate Remark 4.3 (ii) and (iii). Throughout the subsection, q, F,G
are state dependent as in Section 2. For simplicity, we compare state dependent controls
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and path dependent controls only for the raw set values, and we set t = 0 and hence
µ ∈ P0(X0) = P0(S).
We first provide a counterexample to show that the raw set value V0(0, µ) is in general
not equal to the corresponding raw set value V0,path(0, µ) with controls α ∈ Apath.
Example 7.1 Set T = 2, S = {x, x}, A = [a0, 1− a0] for some 0 < a0 < 12 , and
q(0, x, µ, a;x) = q(0, x, µ, a;x) =
1
2
, q(1, x, µ, a;x) = a, q(1, x, µ, a;x) = 1− a;
F (0, x, µ, a) = 0, F (1, x, µ, a) = a[1− a], G(x, µ) = µ(x).
Then V0(0, µ) 6= V0,path(0, µ) for general µ ∈ P0(S).
Proof Since |S| = 2, for any µ ∈ P0(S) clearly it suffices to specify µ(x). Fix µ ∈ P0(S).

















µα1 (x1)q(1, x1, µ
α








































α̃(1, x1)[1 − α̃(1, x1)]
Given α, we see that α̃ is a minimizer if and only if α̃(1, x1) ∈ {a0, 1 − a0}, x1 ∈ S. Thus,
α∗ ∈ Mstate(0, µ) if and only if α∗(1, x1) ∈ {a0, 1− a0}, x1 ∈ S, and






α∗(1, x1)[2− α∗(1, x1)]






+ a0 − a20, 1− a20
}
. (7.1)
We next compute V0,path(0, µ). For any α, α̃ ∈ Apath, we still have µα1 (x) = 12 and
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µ(x0)q(0, x0, µ, α(0, x0);x1)q(1, x1, µ
α

































α̃(1, x0, x1)[1− α̃(1, x0, x1)].
Similarly, α∗ ∈ Apath is an MFE if and only if α∗(1, x0, x1) ∈ {a0, 1− a0}, ∀x0, x1 ∈ S, and












α∗(1, x0, x1)[1 − α∗(1, x0, x1)].
Choose one particular α∗:
α∗(1, x, x1) = a0, α
∗(1, x, x1) = 1− a0, ∀x1 ∈ S.
Then
















α∗(1, x, x1)[1− α∗(1, x, x1)]
= µ(x)a0 + µ(x)[1 − a0] + a0[1− a0],
and similarly,
J(0, µ, α∗;x, α∗) = µ(x)a0 + µ(x)[1− a0] + [1− a0]a0 = J(0, µ, α∗;x, α∗).
So V0,path(0, µ) contains the constant value µ(x)a0+µ(x)[1−a0]+[1−a0]a0, which depends
on µ and is in general not in the V0(0, µ) in (7.1).
We next turn to relaxed controls. Let Arelax be the path dependent ones in Section 4,
and Astaterelax denote the subset taking the form γ(t, x, da). We emphasize again that here we
are considering state dependent q, F,G. Fix t = 0 and µ ∈ P0(S).
Lemma 7.2 For any γ ∈ Arelax, define











































so γ̃ ∈ Astaterelax. Next, by definition µ
γ̃
0 = µ = µ
γ








































s , a;x)γ(s,x, da) = µ
γ
s+1(x).
This completes the induction argument.
Lemma 7.3 If γ∗ ∈ Arelax is a relaxed MFE at (0, µ), then the corresponding γ̃∗ ∈ Astaterelax
is a state dependent relaxed MFE at (0, µ). Moreover, in this case we have
J(0, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗) = J(0, µ, γ̃∗;x, γ̃∗). (7.3)
Proof First, by Lemma 7.2 it is straightforward to verify that
∫
S
J(0, µ, γ;x, γ)µ(dx) =
∫
S
J(0, µ, γ̃;x, γ̃)µ(dx).
On the other hand, since γ∗ ∈ Arelax, by the standard control theory we have
inf
γ∈Arelax
J(0, µ, γ∗;x, γ) = v(µγ
∗
; 0, x) = v(µγ̃
∗
; 0, x) = inf
γ′∈Astaterelax




J(0, µ, γ̃∗;x, γ̃∗)µ(dx) =
∫
S






Since J(0, µ, γ̃∗;x, γ̃∗) ≥ v(µγ̃∗ ; 0, x) and supp (µ) = S, then J(0, µ, γ̃∗;x, γ̃∗) = v(µγ̃∗ ; 0, x)
for all x ∈ S. This implies that γ̃∗ ∈ Astaterelax is a state dependent relaxed MFE at (0, µ), and
consequently (7.4) leads to (7.3).
Theorem 7.4 The MFGs with state dependent relaxed controls and path dependent relaxed
controls have the same relaxed raw set value.
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Proof By Lemma 7.3, clearly the path dependent raw set value is included in the state
dependent raw set value. On the other hand, for any state dependent relaxed control
γ̂∗ ∈ Astaterelax, we may still view γ∗ := γ̂∗ as a path dependent relaxed control, and it
is straightforward to verify that the γ̃∗ ∈ Astaterelax corresponding to γ∗ is equal to γ̂∗.
Then, following the arguments in Lemma 7.3, in particular (7.4), one can easily show
that J(0, µ, γ∗;x, γ∗) = v(µγ
∗
; 0, x) and thus γ∗ is also an MFE among Arelax. Therefore,
J(0, µ, γ∗; ·, γ∗) belong to the path dependent raw set value as well.
7.2 Some postponed proofs




state(t, µ) denote the right side of (2.17)
in the obvious sense. We shall follow the arguments in Theorem 2.4.
(i) We first prove Ṽstate(t, µ) ⊂ Vstate(t, µ). Fix ϕ ∈ Ṽstate(t, µ), ε > 0, and set
ε1 :=
ε
4 . Since ϕ ∈ Ṽ
ε1
state(t, µ), there exist desirable ψ and α
∗ ∈ Mε1state(T0, ψ; t, µ) as





) implies further that there exists










, α̃∗; ·, α̃∗)‖∞ ≤ ε1.
Denote α̂∗ := α∗ ⊕T0 α̃∗ ∈ Astate. Then, for any α ∈ Astate and x ∈ S, similar to the
arguments in Proposition 2.3 (i), we have














































= J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α



































= J(t, µ, α̂∗;x, α̂∗)− ε.
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That is, α̂∗ ∈ Mεstate(t, µ). Moreover, note that
‖ϕ− J(t, µ, α̂∗; ·, α̂∗)‖∞ ≤ ε1 + ‖J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗)− J(t, µ, α̂∗; ·, α̂∗)‖∞




















≤ 2ε1 ≤ ε.
Then ϕ ∈ Vεstate(t, µ). Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain ϕ ∈ Vstate(t, µ).
(ii) We now prove the opposite inclusion. Fix ϕ ∈ Vstate(t, µ) and ε > 0. Let ε1 > 0
be a small number which will be specified later. Since ϕ ∈ Vε1state(t, µ), there exists α∗ ∈
Mε1state(t, µ) such that ‖ϕ−J(t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗)‖∞ ≤ ε1. Introduce ψ(x, ν) := J(T0, ν, α∗;x, α∗).
By (2.10) we have
‖ϕ− J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗)‖∞ = ‖ϕ− J(t, µ, α∗; ·, α∗)‖∞ ≤ ε1.
Moreover, since α∗ ∈ Mε1state(t, µ), for any α ∈ Astate and x ∈ S, we have
J(T0, ψ; t, µ, α
∗;x, α∗) = J(t, µ, α∗;x, α∗)
≤ J(t, µ, α∗;x, α⊕T0 α∗) + ε1 = J(T, ψ; t, µ, α∗;x, α) + ε1.
This implies that α∗ ∈ Mε1state(T0, ψ; t, µ). We claim further that




for some constant C ≥ 1. Then by (2.17) we see that ϕ ∈ ṼCε1state(t, µ) ⊂ Ṽεstate(t, µ) by
setting ε1 ≤ εC . Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, we obtain ϕ ∈ Ṽstate(t, µ).
To show (7.5), we follow the arguments in Proposition 2.3 (ii). Recall v in (2.5) and the

































It is obvious that v(µα
∗




;t,x,α∗(XT0 = x̃) ≥ cT0−t0 , for any x̃ ∈ S. Thus, for C := ct−T00 ,
0 ≤ J(T0, µα
∗
T0

























This implies that α∗ ∈ MCε1state(T0, µα
∗
T0
). Since ψ(·, µα∗T0 ) = J(T0, µα
∗
T0
, α∗; ·, α∗), we obtain
(7.5) immediately, and hence ϕ ∈ Ṽstate(t, µ).
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Proof of the claim in Remark 4.7. By (4.16) and (4.17) we have
γ(Λ























































δα(s,x̃)(da)γ(s, x̃, dα(s, x̃))
∏
x̄∈Xt,xs \{x̃}









































γ ; x̃, γ)γ(s, x̃, da) = γ(s, x̃, da).
That is, γ(Λ
γ) = γ.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Clearly the uniform estimate for J(µα; ·) implies that for v(µα; ·),
so we shall only prove the former one. Fix (t, µ) ∈ [0, T ]×P2 and α, α̃ ∈ Acont, and denote
u(s, x) := J(µα; α̃, s, x). By standard PDE theory u is a classical solution to the linear PDE
in (6.4) and we have the following formula: denoting Xs,xr := x+Br −Bs,
















r )) · ∂xu(r,Xs,xr ) + f(r,Xs,xt , µαr , α̃(r,Xs,xr ))
]Br −Bs
r − s dr
]
.
Then, by the Lipschitz continuity of g and the boundedness of b and f ,










r − s dr
]









Denote Ks := e
λs supx |∂xu(s, x)|, K̄ := supt≤s≤T Ks, for some constant λ > 0. Then











r − s dr














Thus K̄ ≤ C0√
πλ





= 12 , we obtain K̄ ≤ C1 := 2CeλT ,
which implies the desired estimate immediately.
Proof of Proposition 6.5. Fix (t, ~x, ~α, x̄, x̃) and i. For any α̃ ∈ ALcont, introduce
ᾱ(s, x, µ) := α̃(s, x− x̄+ x̃, µ), and denote
X̄is := x̄+B
i


























, j ≥ 1, where


















s )), j 6= i.
By the Girsanov Theorem we have
Ji(t, (~x


























Similarly define X̃i, µ̃N , M̃ j , b̃i, b̃j corresponding to (x̃, α̃) in the obvious sense. Then we







t, (~x−i, x̄), ~α
)
− Ji(t, (~x−i, x̃), (~α−i, α̃))




















∣M̄ js − M̃ js |
]


















Denote ∆x := x̄− x̃. Note that




































































∣M̄ js − M̃ js |2
]
.
Note that B1, · · · , BN are independent. By applying the Ito formula, we have
















































































M̄ jr |b̄jr − b̃jr|]2
]
dr.
Note that, by (7.7),















|b̄jr − b̃jr| ≤
CL
N
|∆x|, j 6= i.










|∆x|2, j 6= i.
and thus
∆Γis ≤ CL|∆x|2, ∆Γjs ≤
CL
N2

















|∆x|, j 6= i. (7.9)
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t, (~x−i, x̄), ~α
)










Since α̃ ∈ AL is arbitrary, we obtain vN,Li
(




t, (~x−i, x̃), ~α
)
≤ CL|∆x|.
Similarly we can show that vN,Li
(
t, (~x−i, x̃), ~α
)
− v ≤ CL|∆x|, and thus obtain (6.12).
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